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1/25/17

Why not just obstruct everything Trump wants to do?

Michael Tracey has noticed that people who once insisted that Obama be "given a chance" to govern are now advocating absolute opposition to Donald Trump - and for that reason, he writes,
proponents of that position should at least recognize that they're changing the "rules of the game" and dispatching with certain "norms" around how presidents are treated at the very beginning of their terms...at least acknowledge the shift.
It's not clear to me why one would need to "acknowledge" any such thing. Why not simply proceed on the understanding that the shift has taken place, and address any objections to that claim as they arise? Tracey himself concedes that "it could well be right to hold Trump to a different standard," so I don't see anything that necessarily needs to be explained or defended here. As far as I can tell, some people believe that the previous rule no longer applies, and no one - not even Tracey - has actually contested this judgment. 

That said, setting aside the burdens of explanation, the rationale for a rule change strikes me as fairly obvious. A standard perspective on the past eight years holds that Republicans pursued a historically unprecedented strategy of near-absolute obstruction - popularly known as the McConnell Strategy - in order to guarantee gridlock under a Democratic president. It was this strategy that liberals demanding cooperation with Obama were reacting to; it was this strategy, and not its opponents, that "changed the rules of the game" and "dispatched with certain norms" of American politics.

What I puzzling is not that some critics have called for Democrats to play by the new rules, but that Democrats, to the last Senator, have insisted on playing by the old ones. Every one of them has now cast at least one confirmation vote for one of Trump's nominees. Even Senator Dick Durbin - who in 2010 openly acknowledged that Republicans were simply working to "deny the president a record of accomplishment" - has now voted to confirm Trump's Secretary of Defense, his Secretary of Homeland Security, and his Ambassador to the United Nations.

As far as I can tell, Tracey also seems to think that we should play by the old rules. What this means, of course, is that Republicans will continue to advance objectives amenable to Republicans, while Democrats will find themselves trapped in gridlock for the foreseeable future. If we are to accept this state of affairs for the sake of maintaining some kind of foolish consistency, I can appreciate Emerson's thoughts on that point; but regardless, I don't see anything overtly wrong with playing by the new rules, so if Tracey has objections, he should actually spell them out.

1/23/17

Liberals are talking about Gandhi again

Friday's counterattack against Richard Spencer has prompted the usual recriminations from liberal critics of violent protest - and among them, Clare Coffey notes, are an unusual number of appeals to absolute pacifism. It doesn't have to be that way; the simpler thing would just be to say that this particular act of violence was ill-advised, which you can do even while leaving the door open to other acts of violence. Chomsky:
...should we take our guns, go out in the street and start destroying Chase Manhattan bank? Well, if you want to get killed in five minutes that's a good suggestion...are there circumstances in which it might be justified to take up arms to overthrow a repressive government? Yeah, sure. For example, I was in favor of the conspirators who tried to kill Hitler. I think that was a good thing to do.
This isn't a particularly ambitious line of argument; Chomsky just relies on principles that most people agree with, like "avoid inconsequential suicide", to advise against violence in a particular case. A liberal who wanted to make this kind of point against punching Spencer would still be wrong, but at least he would still be operating within the intellectual and moral framework of liberalism.

Instead, we're seeing another kind of objection entirely: grand philosophical claims like "violence breeds violence" that are decisively at odds with what liberals actually believe. This point is even clearer when we consider just how many liberals are appealing to Gandhi, who consistently grounded his objections to violence in radical Hindu mysticism. Consider four of the actual arguments Gandhi made about violence against Nazis - what liberal will openly endorse this?

1. Pacifism is such an absolute moral imperative that we should even be willing to accept the complete annihilation of an ethnic minority or target nationality. Gandhi, to the people of occupied Czechoslovakia: "If Hitler is unaffected by my suffering, it does not matter. For I shall have lost nothing worth. My honour is the only thing worth preserving." On the holocaust: "The calculated violence of Hitler may even result in a general massacre of the Jews...if the Jewish mind could be prepared for voluntary suffering, even the massacre I have imagined could be turned into a day of thanksgiving and joy...to the God-fearing, death has no terror." To the people of Great Britain: "You will invite Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini to take what they want...If these gentlemen choose to occupy your homes, you will vacate them. If they do not give you free passage out, you will allows yourselves man, woman and child, to be slaughtered, but you will refuse to owe allegiance to them."
2. Pacifism is worth it if it makes murderous oppressors feel bad about what they did in retrospect. "The German Jews will score a lasting victory over the German gentiles in the sense that they will have converted the latter to an appreciation of human dignity."
3. Violent defense of the oppressed deprives them of the opportunity to experience the personal growth that comes from suffering, and also delays their entrance into the afterlife. "And suffering voluntarily undergone will bring [the Jews] an inner strength and joy which no number of resolutions of sympathy passed outside Germany can. Indeed, even if Britain, France and America were to declare hostilities against Germany, they can bring no inner joy, no inner strength...[Death] is a joyful sleep followed by a joyful waking that would be all the more refreshing for the long sleep."
4. Violence is never justified because Hindu metaphysics teach us that there are no such things as facts. "Satyagraha...excludes the use of violence because man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth and, therefore, not competent to punish."

None of this is to contest Gandhism itself; if you buy into his metaphysics, it makes perfect sense. Similarly, if (say) you accept the Mennonite understanding of Jubilee as "a theological concept providing insight into the nature of God...[as] a guide for living which is to be observed in normal daily practice among believers" (Sloan, 297) then it might make sense to invoke John Howard Yoder or Menno Simons in your complaints about Nazi-punching. The same goes for pacifists from Tolstoy to MLK: in every case, their ethic is embedded in a broader intellectual and philosophical framework (often with religious facets) that has to be accepted or abandoned as a whole.

Suffice to say that almost none of the people who are invoking pacifist icons and pacifist slogans like "violence begets violence" actually take any of this seriously, or even aspire to apply these principles consistently. This is at the very least hypocritical; it represents a disrespectfully opportunistic and selective approporiation from the struggles and traditions of other cultures; and it reflects, in its motivated reasoning, the liberal fetishization of order and procedure that becomes indistinguishable, in its extreme, from the inhuman operation of fascism itself.

1/6/17

How UBI would help fight climate change

My friend Jarrod Myrick - author of "Jarrod's corner" for the Matt Bruenig newsletter, and tireless advocate for Universal Basic Income - has suggested that I write a few words about how UBI would help fight climate change. I'm a little wary of making this case, simply because I think that both causes stand on their own merits: a UBI is a good idea for reasons that are mostly unrelated to climate change, and climate change needs to be managed for reasons that have very little to do with UBI. Nevertheless, Jarrod's intuition on this is better than mine is, so here are three arguments that I think you could made (in order of weakness to strength):


I. DEGROWTH WOULD CURB EMISSIONS

The theory here is that some people, with a guaranteed income, would simply drop out of the workforce; that the labor supply contraction would lead to a drop in GDP; and that this reduction in economic activity would in turn lead to a decline in greenhouse emissions. This is probably the most popular take on this that I've seen, though I think that on these terms it ends up being the weakest.

One immediate problem with this argument, as given, is that it's not clear that UBI would necessarily shrink the labor supply. People work because they need income, but since they also work for other reasons, one can't simply assume that a UBI would catalyze a net reduction in work. If it turns out that UBI gives us the same "amount" of economic productivity (whatever that means) but simply changes the incentives, then an environmentalist argument for UBI that relies on generalized degrowth falls on its face.

A second problem is that even if UBI curbs economic productivity, it may not necessarily follow that this would curb greenhouse emissions. That's because emissions may not be a function of GDP; in the last few years, for example, the two have arguably uncoupled, and there are historical examples of countries that have seen simultaneous economic contraction and growth in carbon emissions. While most data seems to point to a relationship between the two, I don't think we can make assumptions about what would happen given a massive intervention aimed at global reductions in economic activity.

These objections may seem distinct, but I think that they are actually related, and if we bear them in mind we can build a stronger case:


II. EMANCIPATED LABOR WOULD BE GREEN

The degrowth argument, we have seen, rests on two basic assumptions: that people will only work if they need income, and that work necessarily produces greenhouse emissions. Both of these claims, I've suggested, may be faulty. But what if, instead, we suppose that wage-slavery disproportionately incentivizes certain kinds of work - in particular, work tied to the exploitation of fossil fuels?

If this is true, then UBI may very well free people up to engage in labor that produces fewer carbon emissions, with a net positive impact for climate change. This is an argument that can be made without generalized claims about GDP and "economic productivity" and how these things relate to UBI and climate change.

Here, what I think you would have to argue is that there is a direct relationship between wage slavery and the irresponsible use of fossil fuels. Conceptually, this strikes me as a pretty intuitive point: it makes sense that the same economic regime that recklessly exploits labor would also recklessly exploit fossil fuels. All you have to do here is make the standard Marxist environmental case that wage-slavery is what facilitates the bourgeoisie's mobilization of the means of production in an infinitely escalation pursuit of capital - and that technologically, those means of production have always relied in one way or another on burning fossil fuels.

Capitalists, in fact, implicitly recognize this point when they insist that the fix for climate change must be technological - that we cannot hope to place limits on economic activity, and must instead hope for some kind of technological silver bullet that lets us chase profits without burning coal. This point is certainly true if you take wage-slavery for granted; in that case, all you can do is dream of some magical form of production where infinitely expanding resource extraction somehow doesn't have deliterious environmental consequences. It seems to me, however, that no matter how politically and logistically difficult it is to launch UBI, that this approach is still more plausible than the probably-physically-impossible fantasy of infinite clean energy.

Regardless, what seems clear to me is that the fight for UBI and against climate change are both caught up in a basic political fight against capitalism. And for that reason, I think there's a third argument that's even stronger than the first two:


III. UBI WOULD INSTITUTIONALIZE DEMOCRATIC REDISTRIBUTION

You absolutely cannot fight climate change without massive redistribution. And the only way that you get there is by creating powerful institutions through which people can democratically expropriate the commonwealth from rich people who are hoarding it.

The problem is that this is a huge political lift, and since climate change is a progress trap, most people don't feel motivated to fight it. The consequences for failure, as apocalyptic as they are, are also extremely long-term, and by the time anyone feels motivated to do anything about carbon emissions it will probably already be too late.

But this, I think, creates an extremely strong case for UBI - because UBI creates a redistributive institution powerful enough to fight climate change that would provide immediate and significant material benefits for everyone. Once you enshrine the principle that everyone deserves a basic standard of living regardless of ideas about desert, that redistribution on the scale of (say) at least 10% of the national income is warranted, and that we should build a state institution powerful enough to guarantee this - from here, the case for funding green international development is open-and-shut. And more importantly, the systematic leverage that the rich have to fight it has been severely undercut.

Ultimately, I'm not sure how the fight against climate change ever gets off the ground without something resembling this approach. It's not clear that UBI would spark degrowth, or that degrowth would bring down greenhouse emissions; it seems possible that UBI would free people to engage in labor that's less environmentally destructive, but even this is fairly speculative. What strikes me as certain, however, is that people aren't going to fight for adequate redistributive institutions unless there is some kind of powerful, immediate benefit - something more than just the intellectual conviction about the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. UBI is exactly the sort of incentive the fight against climate change needs.

1/5/17

Echoes of Jonah Goldberg's "Liberal Fascism" from the Center for American Progress

Think Progress's Ned Resnikoff has indulged in one of the center's favorite pastimes - trying to link socialism to fascism. There's a lot to unpack here, but for now I just want to look at two points:
1. Trump received support from William Johnson, chair of the American Freedom Party, "through his American National Super PAC."
2. The American Freedom Party advances "a particular strain of white supremacism known as Third Position ideology." Its "most important antecedent is Strasserism...Third Position [ideologue]...Benito Mussolini — the fascist leader par excellence — began his career in politics as a scribbler for various socialist publications; he would go on to smuggle elements of socialist thought into a right-wing, nationalist framework."
Two responses:

1) This all sounds awfully sinister until we notice that the American National Super PAC raised a grand total for Trump of...$14,966. That's less than three people maxing out on their contributions. That's just about $2,000 more than alt-centrists raised for Trump in a single week.  To give you a sense of scale, here's the record-breaking attendance for the American Freedom Party's most recent conference:


So the argument here is that, among the usual cesspool of ethnonationists who always vote for Republicans, this "Third Position" faction (which supposedly draws on socialist ideas) has become unusually powerful and influential? That may very well be the case - but Resnikoff hasn't put in the work to show it. This genre of casual dot-connecting, with zero attention to basic questions of scale and operational relationships, is usually the province of the Lyndon LaRouche pamphleteer who wants to trace Dick Cheney's political philosophy back to Aristotle - not of mainstream political thought.


2) This touches on the deeper problem with Resnikoff's argument, which is that he reads into the opportunistic and transient rhetoric and posturing of (some) historical fascists an underlying ideological affinity - thus "On the white left, it remains subtext." Note the implication of "remains": fascism snuck into leftist thought long ago, and we are supposed to suspect that it's still there, albeit hidden as secret "subtext".

But consider just two of Resnikoff's historical touchstones: the Strasserites and Mussolini. After crediting the Strasserites with putting "the Socialism in National Socialism," Resnikoff notes in passing that
Hitler had Gregor and other prominent Strasserists murdered in the 1934 purge known as the Night of the Long Knives. Otto fled Germany, and lived in exile until 1974.
One might say that this was a way of taking the socialism out of National Socialism, and for good reason: it had become an obstacle to success. By November of 1933, the Nazis were running out of money and bleeding support - in part, because German businessmen were alarmed by their occasional criticism of capitalism. It was only by undercutting Strasser through an alliance with the aristocrat Franz von Papen that Hitler ascended to chancellor. From there, the ascendence of fascism was a story of destroying the welfare state - and murdering its radical partisans.

Similarly, Resnikoff notes that Mussollini was a "scribbler for various socialist publications" - but neglects to mention that one of the very first political actions that we can call "fascist" was the 1919 attack on Avanti - the socialist daily where Mussolini had worked as an editor. That incident exemplified Mussolini's rise to power, and its exercise: his base was gangs of black-shirts who attacked leftists and workers on behalf of the rich, and far from "smuggl[ing] elements of socialist thought" into power, he built an oligarchy that brutally suppressed the influence of labor and radicals.

None of this is particularly controversial among historians. As David Neiwart writes,
the path to power for both Italian Fascists and German Nazis was essentially the same: They presented themselves as "revolutionary socialists" in their initial appeals but, finding the political space for such a movement already well occupied on the left by socialists and communists, shifted their appeals and their alliances to the right and center, particularly with business capitalists who finances them, sponsored their activities, and essentially contracted with them to engage in systematic violence against the Left.
It should give even the centrists among us pause to consider that this passage comes not from some conveniently radical publication, but from David Neiwart's introduction to the History News Network's symposium on Jonah Goldberg's Liberal Fascism. There, an endless series of pre-eminent scholars on fascism - Robert Paxton, Roger Griffin, Matthew Feldman, and others - dismantle Goldberg's infamous argument that "liberalism" (which in the parlance of the right is used interchangeably with socialism to mean "state interventions we dislike") is ideologically and historically wedded to fascism.

Resnikoff's attempt to implicate socialism in fascism through the idiosyncratic politics of marginal early funders is not particularly distinct from Goldberg's own efforts - for example, his tortured attempts to connect Hitler to the "radical chic" of German piano manufacturer Edwin Bechstein. Neither are his attempts to rewrite a history where fascism was "smuggled into" and now "remains" a significant "subtext" of leftist thought. Paxton criticizes this "latent (but misleading) Darwinian convention that if we study the origins of something we grasp its inner blueprint," and adds that
Looking mainly at early fascism starts us down several false trails...Concentrating on origins puts misleading emphasis on early fascism's antibourgeois rhetoric and its critique of capitalism.
If we are seriously interested in how fascism can be prevented and resisted, this is a point we should take to heart - but it's not the point Paxton made to Goldberg, and it's not what I would say to Resnikoff. Here's what Paxton had to say about Goldberg:
Goldberg's scholarship is not an even-handed search for understanding, following the best evidence fully and open-mindedly wherever it might lead. He chooses his scholarly data selectively and sometimes misleadingly in the service of his demonstration. 
That, I think, is where we are with Resnikoff and The Center for American Progress. There are interesting and important questions to ask about the relationship between socialism, centrism, and fascism, but the answers will not be found in that essay. 

1/3/17

Liberals are already working to co-opt socialism for the Democratic Party

In the wake of the 2016 elections, some socialists have turned their attention to the race for the chair of the Democratic National Committee. This, to be sure, will be a fight with consequences, and it seems clear to me that a win by Minnesota Congressman Keith Ellison would be the best possible outcome. For that reason, there are solid tactical reasons to welcome any support he's able to win.

But there are also reasons for socialists to be wary of this race - laid out at length, albeit unintentionally, in a piece this morning by Matt Yglesias. Echoing several other strong endorsements, Yglesias argues that Democrats would be smart to embrace Keith Ellison as DNC chair. For critics of the Democratic party, however, his rationale is less than inspiring:
People whose first major intellectual and emotional engagement with politics was as Deaniacs...became entrenched enough in the establishment that by 2016 they found themselves on the other side of familiar sounding arguments about a previously-obscure Vermont politician’s insurgent primary campaign. 
The promise and the peril of the current generation of people under thirty is that they very much hate the Republican Party but they don’t like the Democratic Party very much either... If that mass of people remains where they were throughout the 2016 election, they’ll be a potentially dangerous force...
I am not sure how much more explicit Yglesias could be. For elite Democrats, the primary and decisive advantage of an Ellison win is his influence with Sanders voters. But this isn't just about his ability to bring them to the polls - when Yglesias writes that Dean voters moved to "the other side of familiar sounding arguments" about politics and policy and "became entrenched enough in the establishment", he writes that approvingly. The hope is not that liberal Democratics will cooperate with the "new people and new energy" that Sanders brought into American politics; the hope is that the establishment will co-opt this movement, just as it did with Howard Dean.

A powerful temptation, moving forward, will be to take liberals at their word when they insist that their goal is to oppose fascism and to oppose Trump. The Democratic primaries, in which the Democratic establishment deliberately sabotaged the campaign of the most electable opposition candidate, should have permanently disabused everyone of that notion - but for those who have already forgotten the lesson, Yglesias's piece should be an instructive reminder. Keith Ellison's candidacy represents just the first step on a tightrope of coalition politics that socialists are going to have to walk for the foreseeable future. We'd do well to proceed with our eyes open.

12/4/16

"Do better": the ideological Taylorism of liberal activism


One of the most odious and monstrous features of capitalism is its ever-intensifying and all-consuming demand for productivity. This drive is most visible in the workplace, where scientific management - also known as Taylorism - is constantly coming up with ways to optimize the performance and efficiency of workers in order to drive up production and drive down costs. Taylorism is why offices are always experimenting with new innovations like standing desks, suggestions for how to get work done during one's commute, Inbox Zero rules, and so on; the goal is to exercise such absolute control over employees that you can squeeze as much work out of them as possible.

But as we see in Taylorism's interest in commuting, capitalism's efficiency and productivity obsessions have a way of creeping into our personal lives as well. Sometimes this is clearly a matter of taking our jobs home, as when employees are expected to be on-call; but Taylorism also infiltrates parts of our lives that have no immediate relationship to work. How many of your smartphone apps are designed to organize and manage various aspects of your life as efficiently as possible? How much of your self-image revolves around eating, exercising, dating, and even relaxing as optimally as you can?

Even our politics can become infiltrated with the ideology of Taylorism, demanding that we must constantly exercise our political agency with absolute efficacy - that we must always, as the liberal catch phrase goes, "do better". We should watch every penny we spend to make sure that it doesn't end up in the pocket of some right-wing corporate oligarch; we should refine our rhetoric so that it has a maximum consequentialist impact on The Discourse, regardless of whether what we are saying happens to be true or correct; we should personally recycle every last soda can in order to drive down our carbon footprint and save the earth through sheer popular meticulousness - you can even get a quantified score on your efforts!

Taylorism is so deeply ingrained into capitalist ideology that all of this seems obvious, even trivial, to most people: we should seek to live our lives as efficiently and productively as possible.

Return, however, to the workplace. What if, instead of exclusively valuing productivity and profits, we also valued the worker's experience of being at work? After all, adults spend an enormous percentage of their waking lives in the office, or at the cash register, or in the warehouse; so it seems like there should also be some value in making the experience as edifying, as pleasant, and yes, even as relaxing as possible. Consider for example Homer Simpson's plan to improve workplace productivity with hammocks. Even if this had no impact on productivity either way, wouldn't there still be some value in having a workplace where we could lie in hammocks? What if, in fact, there were an extremely tiny negative impact on profits; might that not, for society, still be outweighed by the sheer luxury of having hammocks in the office?

Now, extend this line of thought to the political sphere. As political scientists have long observed, being an informed voter takes effort: you have to educate yourself, you have to constantly keep up with current events, you have to study topics that you might not know much about but that can have major consequences for society, and so on. This is all labor that we do in order to exercise our political franchise as productively as possible. But obviously, no one spends all of their time watching the news, or studying policy, or researching candidates. It doesn't matter how serious the circumstances are, or how high the stakes: ultimately, no one believes that they should have to spend every waking moment of their life actively fighting political battles.

If you are a socialist, this makes perfect sense. The fight against capitalism can completely destroy your life, if you let it; we all do what we can, but ultimately, everyone also has the right to try to enjoy their brief time on earth, to try to experience something beyond the class struggle, to live not as mere foils to capitalism, but as humans. There is certainly a balance to be struck here, but it is not the socialist who argues against striking a balance - it is the totalitarian ethic of capitalist Taylorism, with its endless demand for productivity in all things, that rejects any sort of balance. That is the voice that incessantly and relentlessly asks, "Why are you doing this instead of being productive? Why must you indulge in this tactic or that rhetoric, when this thing or that approach would be marginally more efficient and effective?"

Buy into that kind of critique, without placing any value in things like "having a laugh with friends" or "being honest", and you'll have liberal scolds giving your every tweet a ruthless utilitarian score for its infinitesimal effect on the political bottom line. A totalitarian politics that exercises such ruthless control over the minutia of our lives in the name of class struggle is not one that the leftist should accept. On the contrary - we must always remember that the class struggle is itself a form of oppression, and that while socialists have taken up this fight, we did not ask for it. It has been imposed upon us by the domination of the powerful. But Emma Goldman put it best:
One evening a cousin of Sasha, a young boy, took me aside. With a grave face, as if he were about to announce the death of a dear comrade, he whispered to me that it did not behoove an agitator to dance. Certainly not with such reckless abandon, anyway. It was undignified for one who was on the way to become a force in the anarchist movement. My frivolity would only hurt the Cause...I grew furious at the impudent interference of the boy. I told him to mind his own business. I was tired of having the Cause constantly thrown into my face. I did not believe that a Cause which stood for a beautiful ideal, for anarchism, for release and freedom from convention and prejudice, should demand the denial of life and joy. I insisted that our Cause could not expect me to become a nun and that the movement would not be turned into a cloister. If it meant that, I did not want it.

12/2/16

How to come up with any voter demographic argument you want

A few weeks ago I posted some charts laying out the basic demographic trends of this year's presidential election. One of them looked like this:


Even though the data here is objective and indisputable, there are all kinds of different ways that you can read it if you want to measure the performance of millennials. The takes that I've seen, for the most part, largely differ based on two questions:
1. Do we care about candidate support or candidate preference? This is the difference between allowing a "neither one" vote or forcing a choice between two options. A "support" measurement cares about only about whether one actively and affirmatively backs a particular candidate; a "preference" measurement also cares about whether one in some sense opposes a particular candidate, even if one does not affirmatively back the other. There are all kinds of analytical and philosophical reasons why one might use one measure rather than the other. If for instance you're interested in latent dispositions that people don't express through their actual voting behavior, you might care more about preference; but if you want to measure things like apathy, you might care more about support. 
2. Do we want to make a static analysis or a comparative historical analysis? This is the difference between just looking at this year's numbers or placing them in the context of previous elections. A static analysis, for example, would conclude that Clinton's numbers among black voters were extraordinarily high - but a historical analysis would conclude that they were actually low compared to the past few elections. That sort of approach might be useful if, say, you suspect that there are structural / systematic issues that guarantee a baseline of demographic support for a party regardless of candidate, and are more interested in how candidates vary from that baseline; a static analysis is more useful if you reject that sort of assumption.
Crucially, millennial performance in 2016 will look quite different depending on what we decide to measure:
Reading the numbers in a way that flatters or blames millennials is really just a matter of picking the right analytical lens. If you want to attack millennials, do a 2016 support analysis, or a 2016 vs 2012 preference analysis; if you want to praise them, do a 2016 preference analysis, or a 2016 vs 2012 support analysis. These approaches are all perfectly rigorous and legitimate, as far as they go, even though they can give you dramatically different outcomes.

Obviously, coming up with some kind of objective and dispositive conclusion about millennial performance in 2016 is less a matter of (fairly straightforward) number-crunching, and more a matter of defending analytical methodology. This means grappling with all kinds of extremely thorny philosophical and poli-sci controversies about agency, culpability, structural determination, and so on - the kinds of controversies in play when we asked the two basic questions above.

That the overwhelming majority of election analysis doesn't even pretend to care about such issues says everything you need to know about how serious one should take them. In reality, most of our election punditry is just a matter of deciding on a conclusion and then back-filling the corresponding analytical approach, with zero attention to the decisive methodological questions at hand.