Saturday, November 26, 2016

Notes on wrestling, Part III: The athletes

Wrestling is fake. Somehow, this is both its dark secret and its obvious critique; inevitably, it is the great truth that critics declare to wrestling's partisans, who have all this time somehow failed to notice. As a rule, the standard point is to concede this criticism, but to insist that wrestling is a worthy enterprise despite this flaw; even though it lacks the prestige and excellence of true competition, it's still an interesting spectacle nevertheless. We accept what is fake about wrestling as a failing and a blemish; critics decide this is damning, and fans decide to love it anyway.

Here, I want to offer a different defense: wrestling is not actually fake. The outcomes of particular matches are (usually) predetermined, and (usually) neither wrestler is actually trying to beat the other into submission. But despite the pretext, winning matches through physical domination is not actually the point of wrestling. In reality, wrestlers have two goals:
1) To maintain an extreme degree of physical conditioning - not only in order to accomplish the second goal, but also in order to create and advance a personal brand built around body aesthetics; 
2) To master the physically demanding set of skills needed to perform matches safely and convincingly.
That's it. These are by no means trivial goals, or even remotely attainable for most people; a wrestler's struggle to achieve them is definitely not fake and certainly not scripted. Both require the raw talent, physical gifts, relentless training, and excellence in performance one expects of any athlete; the price of failure ranges from a legacy of mediocrity to employment problems to serious injury. A wrestler who succeeds will avoid injury, and at least have a shot at building a reputation, holding down a steady career, and making enough money to live and retire on. Fans, meanwhile, are acutely aware of all of this, and evaluate a wrestler's performance just as one would evaluate any other athlete's.


TRAINING

One of the first things that anyone who watches professional wrestling notices is that most of its performers are in ridiculously good shape. Not just "they could be athletes" good shape - we're talking good shape compared to athletes themselves.

In terms of conditioning, your typical professional wrestler is most comparable to basketball players, and only exceeded by extreme endurance athletes like distance runners and swimmers. They typically perform multiple times every week, periodically in Iron Man or Royal Rumble matches that can run for more than a full continuous hour. During that time, they are expected to run around the ring, to land acrobatics and execute stunts, and to do all of this safely and convincingly, with almost no margin of error. Wrestlers who are too tired to do this are "gassed", in wrestling jargon, and are considered inferior performers. Fans generally develop an intuitive sense of when a wrestler is gassed, but some even break it down into a science:
I wanted to know just how many minutes The Rock “worked” his match with CM Punk at Elimination Chamber. So, the match still fresh in my DVR, I re-watched it and, with my trusty stop watch timed whenever The Rock “worked”... 
Approx Bell-to-bell Match Time: 20 minutes
Rocky’s total “worked” minutes: 4 minutes 30 seconds
Percent of match “worked”: 22.5%
This, needless to say, was considered a poor performance, and evidence that The Rock - having spent about a decade away from the ring making movies - was out of shape. By the way, this, in professional wrestling, is "out of shape":


One reason why a professional wrestler can look like this and still be out of shape is that professional wrestlers are huge. Most are easily as large as professional football players, and they're generally much more muscular - for comparison, check out this clip from Wrestlemania II, when they actually fought NFL players in a battle royal. The Rock's diet is so insane that FiveThirtyEight has written about it multiple times (it basically involves truckloads of cod), and his workouts are comparable to a bodybuilder's.

Historically, of course, prolific steroid use was a major contributor to pro-wrestling physiques. After a 1993 federal drug trafficking prosecution, a 2007 Congressional investigation, and a horrific high-profile murder-suicide, the WWE implemented a "Wellness Policy" program featuring random drug testing and a strict disciplinary process. Like most such efforts in professional athletics, this solution isn't perfect; there are still loopholes in the program that are probably being exploited to this day. Still, the Wellness Policy has had an obvious impact on the industry. Performers are noticeably less massive than they used to be, and those who are often appear to have come by it honestly.

Aside from performance demands, a wrestler's fitness regimen is also significantly driven by an expectation - by management, and by the public - that they maintain a certain look. Some, like Mark Henry and Paul Wight, are simply promoted as enormous giants, and their regimens involve maintaining high body weight and enough cardiovascular fitness to perform. Others, like Big E Langston and Mason Ryan, are essentially bodybuilders; still others, like Tyler Breeze and Roman Reigns, are promoted as sex icons. As they age and their bodies break down, this level of fitness always becomes more difficult to maintain, which is why only a select few keep wrestling in their fifties.



FIGHTING

Ultimately, the art of wrestling is built around two skills: attacking an opponent, and reacting to (or "selling") the attacks. Both are to be done as convincingly - and safely - as possible, though these standards have fluctuated over the years. Decades ago, audiences were fine with cartoonishly unrealistic, Popeye-style windup punches and absurdly exaggerated flops...


...today, this usually only happens as a joke, and audiences generally expect to believe what they see. During the mid-to-late nineties a grittier wrestling style punctuated with high-risk stunts became popular - most famously culminating in Mick Foley's iconic, definitely-not-fake 16-foot fall through a table in 1998. Today, such stunts are less frequent (though they do still happen), and wrestlers try to avoid serious injury risks while still maintaining a realistic performance.

That is what "safety" means in the modern era. Wrestling has never been "fake" in the sense that nobody gets hurt; performers routinely land actual strikes on each other, and many falls, slams, and tumbles are physically impossible to pull off without some degree of pain or risk. The actual goal, in practice, is to avoid injury and minimize pain. To do this, performers master a large set of techniques and moves that are either standard practice for stuntmen, or that have been painstakingly developed in the industry over the years.

For example, one of the most basic skills a wrestler has to learn is how to take "a bump" - a hard fall, typically onto one's back. Taking a bump has two major components. First, one must try to hit the ground in a way that spreads the impact across as wide a surface area as possible; this diffuses the force hitting any one part of the body. Second, one has to try to avoid the whiplash that can accompany a bump, generally by tucking one's chin into the neck.

This technique may sound simple, but in practice it's very difficult to get right every time: it's physically counterintuitive and requires significant, active concentration. All-time wrestling great Ric Flair, for one, was known for his ability to take bumps, which is one reason why he managed such a long and relatively injury-free career. Obviously, however, a wrestler has to know how to do more than just fall down correctly - in fact, many of the stunts they have to master become absurdly elaborate.


While there is a technique to taking hits, there's also an art to it; after all, the aim isn't merely to be safe, but to be safe while conveying that one has actually been hurt. For this reason, ironically, some of the most gifted and respected athletes in professional wrestling are the ones who are best at getting beat up. One of the best at this, right now, is a guy named Dolph Ziggler:


Ziggler is a master of looking like he's just been murdered. He typically looks like he's doing nothing to protect himself from serious injury: his body goes limp, he hits the ground hard, and it often even seems like there's some whiplash going on. No matter how clumsy and stunted his opponent's performance actually is, Ziggler can make them look like a million bucks simply by taking his lumps convincingly.

Other wrestlers are better known for their offense. Sometimes, this just means being able to execute an attack safely: for example, even though it's one of the sport's most iconic moves, the "piledriver" is so dangerous that only a few performers (such as The Undertaker) are even allowed to try it. Other moves are simply too difficult for most wrestlers to even attempt, particularly flying acrobatic moves like the Red Arrow; botching a stunt like this can be extraordinarily dangerous, as Brock Lesnar discovered at Wrestlemania XIX when he attempted a Shooting Star Press and got a severe concussion for his trouble:


Incidentally, if you've heard the name Brock Lesnar before, there's a reason. Even outside of professional wrestling, Lesnar is a premiere athlete: he is an NCAA Division I wrestling champion and a former UFC heavyweight champion. And Lesnar consistently incorporates both amateur wrestling and mixed-martial arts elements into his professional wrestling performance, for example here working in kimura locks and knee lifts from his fighting background. The use of diverse fighting styles, each with their own arsenal of moves and holds, is a defining feature of the performance, which is why most wrestlers have some minimal training in "real" wrestling and fighting sports. Many, of course, have much more than minimal training. Kurt Angle is an Olympic gold medalist; Dolph Ziggler and Jack Swagger are both accomplished collegiate wrestlers; Alberto Del Rio and The Undertaker both have backgrounds in Brazilian Jiu Jitsu and kickboxing; and so on. Here's how John Morrison describes his training:
...I practiced gymnastics. I also did martial arts. I wanted to be like a Hollywood stuntman...I had a lot more aerial coordination from all the hours I was spending in the gym. I could jump and twist and flip. All that skill set had a lot of carry-over into wrestling...how many steps to take between the ropes. The footwork. A lot of subtleties that people might not notice.
Morrison is right that these subtleties are easy to miss - but this is simply a testament to his skill as a performer and an athlete. It's precisely because wrestlers are so talented that their performance comes off, to critics, as so effortless.

Saturday, November 12, 2016

2016 was the apathy election

In the wake of the 2016 elections, pundits are poring through the exit polls to tease out the preferences of various key identitarian demographics. As I've noted in the past, however, these analyses almost invariably leave out a significant preference in American politics: the preference not to vote for either major candidate. If we hope to gain some kind of insight into how various groups think about American politics, we have to take into account the possibility that they may simply not care whether one candidate or the other wins. For that reason, I've been digging through the numbers and am going to break them down here into four main groups: gender, race, age, and income.*


From 2012 to 2016, both men and women went from caring about the outcome to not caring. Among Democratic men and women, as well as Republican women, care levels dropped about 3-4 points; Republican men cared a little less too, but only by one point. Across the board, in any case, the plurality of voters simply didn't care.


White voters cared even less in 2016 then in 2012, when they also didn't care; most of that apathy came from white Republicans compared to white Democrats, who dropped off a little less. Voters of color, in contrast, continued to care - but their care levels dropped even more, by 8 points (compared to the 6 point drop-off among white voters). Incredibly, that drop was driven entirely by a 9 point drop among Democratic voters of color which left Democrats with only slim majority 51% support; Republicans, meanwhile, actually gained support among people of color.


The story when we break down the vote by age is more complicated, though across the board everyone cared less about the outcome than they did in 2012. Care levels dropped most dramatically among the elderly (-12) and Gen-Xers (-10), who went from caring to not caring this year. Neither of those drops was significantly inflected by party. Boomers, predictably, were the only age demographic who continued to care, and were also the only age demographic where support for Republicans increased; support for Democrats, meanwhile, dropped by 3 points. Millennial care levels also dropped significantly, driven mostly by disinterest in the Democrat (though they also cared less about the Republican, too).



Again, the same pattern holds: everyone cared less this time around. Here, deterioration of support is clearly driven by class. Among poorer demographics, Republicans mostly held the line, while Clinton only had minor losses among richer demographics. The big hit for Clinton came among the lower two brackets (losing 7 and 6 points, respectively), while the big hit for Trump came among the rich (-8). 

The major trend in 2016 was one of increasingly apathy. Within that broader trend, the demographic patterns are muddy. Deviations in relatively support from group to group don't map well onto the standard media narratives that dominated this election; for example, apathy grew more among women and voters of color than among men and white voters. Among the candidates, Clinton either broke even or lost support among every single demographic group, while Trump won support among voters of color and boomers. 

Ultimately, Trump managed to stem his losses among men, the poor, and millennials - and among boomers and voters of color he actually improved the GOP's numbers. Clinton, meanwhile, lost voters in every demographic across the board; she took major hits among voters of color and the poor, and only managed to minimize her losses among wealthier voters. Trump took his largest hit among those same wealthiest voters, but it turns out that pandering to the rich while abandoning the poor just isn't a winning strategy.


* All numbers are based on Edison exit polling cross-referenced with total population numbers from the US Census.

Friday, November 11, 2016

Trump's GoFundMe donors did more to help Trump in North Carolina than Jill Stein

It's simple arithmetic:
These aren't surprising numbers. A cost of $5.11 per vote is just slightly lower than the average $7 that winners spent in 2008 House races, and Trump ran an extraordinarily cost-efficient campaign. The more controversial question is how much of the GoFundMe funding we can consider a direct investment in the Trump campaign. I would argue that we have to include all of it, since our concern here is risk: Trump may have not have benefited from all of that money, but he could have. Even if we only want to count a fraction of it, though, it doesn't end up mattering.

That's because according to the North Carolina State Board of Elections, Jill Stein only earned 692 votes. So even if we only give half of the GoFundMe total to Trump - or even a third - they still did more to elect him than Stein voters did.

By the way, it's worth adding here that the 1:1 correspondence between a vote for Trump and a vote for Stein is itself analytically dubious; as David Roberts noted earlier this year, a vote for Stein is at worst a half-vote for Trump, not a full one. If we accept this distinction, then we should divide Stein's vote total by two when comparing it to donations to Trump. So now we have two variables: how much of the GoFundMe total we give to Trump, and whether we count Stein votes as half votes or full votes. Again, the arithmetic is completely straightforward:


So depending on your assumptions, the GoFundMe may have had around seven times the impact on Trump's numbers that Jill Stein did - and regardless of your assumptions, it certainly at least had more of an impact.

Ultimately, Trump won North Carolina by such a wide margin (177,529 votes) that neither Stein nor the GoFundMe decided the outcome - but of course, we hardly knew this at the time. In fact, the polling had North Carolina so close that Nate Silver ranked it fourth among his "tipping point" states, with an 11.2% chance of deciding the election. If you give the GoFundMe donors a pass on this, you have to give a pass to Stein voters in virtually every other state, where their odds of deciding the election were far less significant. Only in Florida, Pennyslvania, and Michigan can Trump's GoFundMe donors even possibly claim any kind of moral high ground over Stein voters, and even then the claim is hilariously tenuous at best.

Thursday, November 10, 2016

Nothing polite to say

Earlier this year, the Bernie Sanders campaign made a few comments that earned more media coverage than most of his actual platform. First, in late January, rapid response director Mike Casca advised in a tweet that "if you support @berniesanders, please follow the senator's lead and be respectful when people disagree with you." And just a couple weeks later on CNN, Sanders himself added, "Look, anybody who is supporting me that is doing the sexist things is—we don’t want them."

Predictably, Clinton partisans seized on both comments as evidence that the campaign was "very concerned", not just about potential sexism, but about "trolling" and the generally "cultish behavior of his supporters". That's what Jamil Smith wrote - neatly echoing the campaign's plan to insist that "Sanders supporters are flooding the internet with troubling comments about women" (a necessary line of criticism "since most of our attacks haven't been working"). And now, of course, we know that Smith wrote this just weeks after coordinating with the campaign to roll out "Bernie hits...without [their] fingerprints".

The so-called "Bernie Bro" controversy, it turns out, was always more complicated than it appeared. As many of us were at pains to point out, it was always an exaggerated and cynically hyped smear campaign by Clinton. But here, I want to point out that even the Sanders response has to be understood cynically - as an attempt to parry political attacks, win the Democratic nomination, and defeat Donald Trump.

In fact, today we can be fairly certain that the Sanders campaign was privately just as infuriated by Clinton as her critics, the notorious Bernie Bros. One reason we know this is that Sanders has admitted it himself:
Trust me, if they went into our emails...I’m sure there would be statements that would be less than flattering about, you know, the Clinton staff.
It's pretty easy to understand why they would be angry: by just about every metric imaginable, Hillary Clinton led one of the worst presidential campaigns in modern history. It was a profoundly reactionary campaign, built entirely on rolling back the horizons of the politically possible, fracturing left solidarity, undermining longstanding left priorities like universal healthcare, pandering to Wall Street oligarchs, fomenting nationalism against Denmark and Russia, and rehabilitating some of history's greatest monsters - from Bush I to Kissinger. It was a grossly unprincipled campaign that belligerently violated FEC Super PAC coordination rules and conspired with party officials on everything from political attacks to debate questions. It was an obscenely stupid campaign that all but ignored Wisconsin during the general election, that pitched Clinton to Latino voters as their abuela, that centered an entire high-profile speech over the national menace of a few thousand anime nazis on Twitter, and that repeatedly deployed Lena Dunham as a media surrogate.

But Clinton's campaign wasn't just reactionary, unprincipled, and stupid; it was also doomed. Obviously doomed. Until the bitter end, the Clinton campaign and its partisans projected an absolutely triumphalist front of inevitability; even its most "pessimistic" apparatchiks, like BNR blogger Sarah Kendzior were still predicting "an ultimate HRC win" just hours before she lost. In contrast, by May, the Sanders campaign was already warning that "Hillary Clinton... [is] deeply unpopular" and questioning her ability to win "key battleground states like Ohio, Florida and Pennsylvania". (She only needed two; in the end, she lost all three.)

This was a point the Bernie Bros - with increasing urgency, desperation, and yes, even anger - made time and time again. For my part, I cannot even begin to convey how horrific it was to watch pundits relentlessly hype Clinton's electability, even to the point of implying that skeptics about this were racists:
[E]lectability is much more important to black and Latino voters than it is to whites...[Clinton] has the strong backing of those who are the most dispossessed and threatened. Why is it we hear so...little about [this]? I’ll leave you to ponder that one on your own.
As it turns out, one reason we heard little about black and Latino confidence in Clinton is that she lost 5% of the former and 6% of the latter from 2012. Even during the primaries it was clear to me that Clinton was already having trouble turning out black voters, and that this reflected a whole range of serious, underlying problems:
Black Americans...report little faith in the government in general: a majority (58%) say that "the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves" (21% report not sure); a majority (52%) say that "most of the time" special interests are "able to get what they want by contributing money to political campaigns" (22% report not sure); and a majority (57%) report that politicians "lie to get elected" (6% report not sure). Moreover, Pew reports that only 41% of black Americans believe "that voting gives people some say in how government runs things and that ordinary citizens can do a lot to influence the government in Washington".
These were the kinds of points that Bernie Bros made time and time again: that Clinton's strength among women and voters of color was being dramatically exaggerated; that her weakness among young people was a serious liability; that third-party attrition was a marginal problem at worst; and so on. These were points we made constantly, aggressively, and even obsessively, to anyone who would listen, and even when no one would. And when elites like Tomasky, or political operatives like Smith, smugly dismissed us as trolls and bigots, we just made these points with increasing exasperation, and yes, even belligerence - because we saw exactly what was happening and how it would end.

As Trump takes office, I simply cannot imagine the sheer infantile pettiness and conflict aversion it would take to begrudge anyone their anger about this. Just as Sanders had to issue token apologies to defang the cynical Bernie Bro smear campaign against his candidacy, so today his role as the de facto standard bearer of the American left demands a certain degree of decorum. For the rest of us Bernie Bros, there may be nothing polite to say about what the Clinton campaign has done to our country - but god help us if we don't raise hell.

Thursday, November 3, 2016

Hillary Clinton's incrementolution

Dylan Matthews's latest for Vox, Hillary Clinton's quiet revolution, has successfully trolled me. Congratulations out of the way, let's compare the two ways that Matthews talks about liberal politics in general and Clinton in particular. On one hand,

  • Clinton often gets described as an incrementalist, with a relatively modest agenda. This makes sense...
  • "I think a lot of Clinton's proposals are very much a step..."
  • Clinton does not get the US up to European standards...she moves the ball forward...
  • It's doubtful that [Clinton's] reforms would get to 100 percent universal coverage...
  • Her plan for universal pre-K for 4-year olds is almost the definition of a half-measure...it's one year closer...
  • Clinton would take an important step towards...
  • "I see a lot of her proposals as moving in the direction of..."
  • Clinton's policies go a long way toward...
  • The sheer ambition of Clinton's agenda...really did pale in scale to that of her primary opponent...
  • Her plan is full of...tweaks of existing policy rather than...big overhauls...
  • Clinton is, at root, a pragmatist who...works within the system...She doesn't propose totally overhauling the way it does taxation; she proposes tweaks and nudges and expansions of existing programs.

On the other hand,
  • This is not incrementalism.

Say what you will about the substance of Matthews' policy analysis, but it's pretty bizarre for him to insist that the way other people depict Clintonian incrementalism "misleads more than it informs." What does it inform us of to insist that her politics are not incremental - even as we describe them in terms of taking steps, moving the ball forward, tweaks and nudges, and so on? How does this not mislead the reader?

That, of course, is the point: Matthews didn't write this article to clarify anything, but rather to muddy the waters, and grant Clinton the prestige of revolution while openly insisting that she is not revolutionary in any coherent sense. Left and liberal wonks will have plenty of fun relitigating the familiar policy and strategic debates touched upon in this piece, but tethering all of that to iconoclastic redefinitions of "incremental" and "revolutionary" betrays some profound ideological weakness. Matthews trying to rebrand liberalism as "a minimal viable product of social democracy" reads like nothing so much as Charles C.W. Cooke trying to rebrand himself as "conservatarian" after both "conservative" and "libertarian" got too embarrassing. With Vox trying to sell Clinton as both an incrementalist and a revolutionary, can incrementolution be far behind?

Wednesday, November 2, 2016

Relax - or, Why I Will Not Be Voting For Hillary Clinton

Back in 2011, as Republicans hard-balled Obama by refusing to raise the debt-ceiling and the president moved ever-closer to capitulating to their demands, it occurred to me, "You know who'd put up a better fight than this? Hillary Clinton."

This, in fact, had been a central premise of her 2008 campaign: Obama was a naive optimist who didn't understand the realities of partisan warfare, while Clinton was a hardened political veteran with no illusions about Republican good faith. At the time, a common left position was that Obama should either call the GOP's bluff, refuse to negotiate, and let Republicans take the blame for a national default - or that he should aggressively finesse the problem with all kinds of legal maneuvers, like minting a trillion dollar coin. I wondered if, perhaps, Clinton would have the inclination and political courage to do what Obama wouldn't; I suspected that, just maybe, she might.

Largely for this reason, I occasionally wondered if perhaps Clinton would have made a better president than Obama. Not because of any significant ideological difference between the two - as I've written for years, "Clinton, like Obama, is a liberal state capitalist" - but simply because Clinton, unlike Obama, is instinctively combative. Sometimes you can do better with a good negotiator who aims low than a mediocre negotiator who aims a little higher.

Since then, three things began to change my assessment of Clinton.

First and foremost came my gradual realization that the so-called "McConnell strategy" was working. This was not always a sure thing; particularly during the debt ceiling crisis, it seemed to me entirely possible that absolute obstruction could become a major political liability for Republicans, and that they would be punished for it at the polls. Yet the backlash never came, and today it seems to me that the GOP has no reason to abandon its strategy. Which means that the major difference I saw between Clinton and Obama - negotiating competence - is basically moot. The GOP's intransigence completely negates whatever advantages as a politician Clinton may have over her predecessor, and in fact they've already telegraphed their plans to escalate their obstruction to unprecedented levels.

The second thing to change my assessment of Clinton has been the rise of Donald Trump and the utterly ineffectual response by American liberals. Academically, I knew that this is how it works: the postwar left was quite explicit about the impotence of liberalism before fascism, and even some of our more insightful liberals long recognized the uniquely decadent impotence of the modern Democratic establishment. But watching Clinton and other liberals victim-blame black, Latino and Muslim protesters for defending themselves at Trump rallies; watching Clinton and other liberals routinely misrepresent racism as a problem that doesn't afflict the rich; and watching wealthy Democrats even go so far as to fundraise for Donald Trump, it's become clear to me just how close to the precipice of fascism we are, and how little liberals will do to stop it. Democrats, of course, have tried to hype this danger as the reason we must vote for them - but even if Clinton wins tomorrow, this behavior proves that it is only, with modern liberalism, a matter of time until the next Trump wins.

The third thing to change my assessment of Clinton has been the sheer extremity of aggression of her campaign against the American left. As I wrote a while back:
Not only do the Clintons disagree with left politics - they clearly see the movement left as a political enemy that they need to actively destroy...Practically speaking, this means that Clinton is likely to invest more time, energy, resources and political capital into attacking the left than Obama did. 
Perhaps most damning on this count has been mounting proof that Clinton successfully co-opted the Democratic Party itself into a campaign arm against Bernie Sanders, leaving the left with no democratic voice within the two major parties. The notion that the left ever had any road to power within the Democratic Party was always mostly a rhetorical sham, but with even the pretense of fair cooperation and competition among the liberal-left now jettisoned by party elites, it would be madness to view liberals as anything more than the enemy of an enemy.


These three considerations - insurmountable Republican obstruction, the rise of fascism, and broken faith with the left as allies - have all conspired to push me away from Hillary Clinton. It didn't have to be this way. Had Obama shown the will to overcome the McConnell strategy instead of capitulating to it, or had the Clinton demonstrated anything more than ambivalence about winning back Congress, I might placed some value in her skill as a politician. Had Clinton and her liberal allies shown a serious appreciation for the danger of fascism - rather than simply using it as a threat to cow the left into submission - I might have some confidence in the Democratic party's ability to ward off future challenges. If Clinton had won clean against Sanders (which I believe she probably would have!) instead of betraying the solidarity of the American left, I might have had some reason to move forward as an equal partner in the Democratic Party.

And here's the twist: despite all of this, I still might have voted for Clinton. But when I look at Clinton's numbers today in my home state, this is what I see:



And all of the drama over lesser-evilism and the privilege of people who spoil elections becomes completely academic. For the overwhelming majority of Americans, these endless strategic / semiotic debates about what one's vote means and what it says about you are statistically irrelevant, because for most of us, our vote - as a matter of basic probability - won't change anything. If you live in Florida, North Carolina, or Ohio, feel free to bite your nails and brood over this as much as you like. But if you live in New York, or Washington DC, or really any state where either candidate's lead is well outside the margin of error - if you live in any of these states, and you're feeling anxious - do yourself a favor, and let go of the paranoia that your vote is going to be the one that matters. It won't.

Personally, I have an old Beavis and Butthead pog that I've taped two names to: Stein on one side, La Riva on the other. Depending on how motivated I feel tomorrow, I'll stop by my polling station and flip a coin.

Tuesday, November 1, 2016

Crony capitalism is bad, but cronies are very good

Work is just one of many ways that we satisfy our needs as people living in relationships with other people - and one of the most sinister aspects of capitalism, Marx argues, is the way that it severs this direct link between work and our relationships.

When I make a widget, for example, I rarely do this because I need one, or because my friends or family need one. When I work in cooperation with someone, I am not doing this as a personal favor for them, and if they compensate me, that's not personal either. These kinds of personalized social interactions - doing things for people because you care about them, building relationships around trust and intimacy, and so on - these are all deeply a part of what it is to be human. But under capitalism, all of my labor is just input into a giant impersonal machine that outputs money, which I can then put back into the machine so that it will output something that satisfies some personal need. None of this really involves empathy or intimacy of trust or anything of the sort: as Marx puts it, the "immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labor...is the estrangement of man from man."

This is why I suspect that in a better world, nepotism and cronyism wouldn't just be permissible - they'd be the rule. Work would be a natural and direct extension of our relationships with other people. Helping people succeed in their goals would be an obvious thing that friends do for friends. The problem one runs into so frequently under capitalism is that the powerful try to have it both ways:


This is from an exchange published by Wikileaks in which John Podesta attempts to secure a job at the Center for American Progress for the daughter of a friend. The problem here is that even as Civic Ventures maintains that "helping Sarah get access is what we do for the kids of our friends," its founder, Marc Freeman, calls for "labor market efficiency" (Encore, 177) and decries when workers are "skilled...yet out of the labor market" (Prime Time, 115); even as Podesta pulls strings for his friend, he decries "crony capitalism" (The Power of Progress, 7) and insists that we can "save capitalism from its worst excesses" (The Power of Progress, 26); and even as Tanden apologizes to Podesta for failing to hire his friend, she declares that "what distinguishes America from every other country is this investment we have in meritocracy, that anyone can do well based on their own hard work." (CSPAN, 2/2012).

In other words: socialism for me, but not for thee. The rich and powerful get to escape from the "estrangement of man from man" imposed by capitalism; they have the privilege of helping each other like any friend would. But at the same time, they are all fighting for a world where none of us can do the same: they hoard wealth for themselves, and insist that they earned it through an impersonal system of merit which must be kept in place. As a result, of course, the rest of us live in a state of austerity and precarity, and can barely take care of ourselves, much less each other.

The rich have done everything they can to give "cronyism" a bad name, but faced with so-called crony capitalism, we should ditch the capitalism and keep our cronies.